Stage330 adds automatic SHA256 hash generation to the Stage329 audit submission workflow.
It reads evidence files, generates a SHA256 map, creates hash_manifest.json, and prepares
reproduction_evidence.json for the Stage328 Evidence Match Gate.
Stage332 extends Stage331 by cryptographically signing the execution session.
The audit target is execution_session.json.
The execution session becomes signed audit evidence through GPG signature,
Sigstore bundle, and public verification.
This stage proves who generated the execution evidence, whether the evidence
was modified, and whether the execution session can be independently verified.
Stage334 AI Vulnerability Watch Atlas + Stage335 Safe AI Vulnerability Intelligence Fetcher
Stage334 extends Stage333 by adding a safe AI vulnerability watch system.
It organizes AI failure patterns from security sources into a public audit atlas.
Stage333 → Stage334
Stage333 Transparency Log
↓
signed evidence history
↓
AI vulnerability source watch
↓
AI vulnerability atlas
↓
safe reproduction planning
Stage335 Safe AI Vulnerability Intelligence Fetcher
Stage335 extends Stage334 by collecting safe AI vulnerability intelligence metadata.
Dangerous prompts, exploit code, weaponized payloads, and attack automation are not published.
Stage336 extends Stage335 by adding live public AI/security intelligence metadata.
This is added after the Stage335 Safe AI Vulnerability Intelligence Fetcher section,
preserving all previous Stage329–Stage335 functions.
Stage335 → Stage336
Stage335 Safe Intelligence Fetcher
↓
Safe intelligence feed
↓
Collection transparency log
↓
Stage336 Safe Live Intelligence Fetcher
↓
Live public metadata collection
↓
Audit metadata connected to Stage335
Stage337 adds safe reproduction templates for AI vulnerability verification.
This stage does not include attack code, exploit payloads, bypass steps, or automated attack logic.
Stage339 is fail-closed. If behavior is unknown, evidence is insufficient,
signature verification fails, or policy evaluation errors, the system rejects or blocks.
This stage does not publish attack code, dangerous prompts, payloads, bypass steps, or exploit automation.
Stage339: Deterministic Protocol Proof
Stage339 now verifies deterministic protocol behavior.
The same canonical input is evaluated twice. If both evaluations produce
the same canonical decision hash, deterministic_protocol.same_input_same_output
becomes true.
Input fingerprint SHA256
First decision SHA256
Second decision SHA256
same_input_same_output
This strengthens the Stage284 integration by proving that the same input
produces the same policy action output.
Stage340: Unified Verification Session Manifest
Stage340 connects the Stage254 session manifest concept to the Stage339 unified QSP behavior policy action result.
This stage binds one complete verification result into a session manifest.
Stage344 does not publish private keys, attack code, dangerous prompts, exploit payloads, or automated attack logic.
Stage345: Artifact Download Verification Engine
Stage345 extends Stage344 by turning GitHub artifact verification readiness into actual artifact download verification.
This stage downloads the GitHub Actions artifact, verifies SHA256 binding, checks the session manifest, checks the GitHub run binding, and produces an accept / reject verification report.
Stage346 does not publish private keys, attack code, dangerous prompts, exploit payloads, or automated attack logic.
Stage347: Quantum-Safe Behavior Template Layer
Stage347 extends Stage346 by adding PQC/QKD behavior templates to the multi-artifact verification layer.
It connects safe metadata from quantum-safe implementation history to the current QSP evidence verification rail.
PQC behavior template validation
QKD behavior template validation
ML-KEM / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA metadata confirmation
QKD key-session and failover metadata confirmation
safe metadata only: no private keys, no raw key material
Stage351 extends Stage350 by binding the enforcement session, CI/local execution context,
Sigstore OIDC requirements, and PQC ML-DSA intent into one hybrid signature manifest.
Stage350 enforcement_session.json is the signature target.
session_sha256 is fixed into the manifest.
CI / local execution context is recorded.
Sigstore OIDC is required for CI acceptance.
GPG / Sigstore OIDC / Ed25519 / PQC ML-DSA are represented in one signature envelope.
PQC ML-DSA is recorded as intent_only metadata, not as a fake completed signature.
No private keys, raw secrets, or unverified signature claims are published.
Stage354 initializes a signature key rotation ledger with Stage178
Assumption / Threat Model / Guarantee binding. It records GPG,
Sigstore OIDC, Ed25519, and PQC ML-DSA key lifecycle states without
publishing private keys or fake active PQC key claims.
Stage355: Signature Key Status Verification & Revocation Enforcement Layer
Stage355 extends Stage354 by reading the signature key rotation ledger,
verifying key status records, checking revocation safety, preserving PQC
ML-DSA as intent_only unless real proof exists, and binding the Stage354
entry_hash as the Stage355 previous_hash.
Stage356 extends Stage355 by binding the Stage355 integrity result into a
runtime verification gate. If Stage355 is missing, rejected, inconsistent,
or contains violations, the runtime decision becomes block. Local execution
is marked as warn, while CI execution can be allowed only when the required
checks pass.
Stage357 extends Stage356 by mapping runtime decisions into defensive
actions. allow continues execution, warn isolates risky capabilities and
continues safely, and block terminates execution. Stage357 binds the
Stage356 receipt_sha256 as previous_hash and publishes metadata-only action
receipts without exposing private runners, secrets, payloads, or exploit code.
Stage358 extends Stage357 by enforcing temporal validity between signing_time
and key lifecycle windows. It checks valid_from <= signing_time <= valid_until
and signing_time < revoked_at when revocation metadata exists. Stage358 binds
the Stage357 action receipt SHA256 as previous_hash and publishes metadata-only
temporal validation without claiming real GPG, Sigstore, Rekor, or PQC signature
verification.
Stage359: Real Public Key Fingerprint Validation Layer
Stage359 extends Stage358 by binding the Stage358 temporal validity result
into public-key fingerprint validation. It checks public_key_fingerprint
presence and SHA256 format, validates key_id / algorithm / validity-window
consistency, preserves PQC ML-DSA as intent_only, and records readiness for
future external timestamp and revocation proof verification without exposing
private keys or real key material.
Stage360 extends Stage359 by binding the Stage359 public-key fingerprint
result into external timestamp proof metadata. It creates a timestamp target
SHA256, records OpenTimestamps and RFC3161 proof readiness, returns
pending_timestamp_proof when real external proof is not present, and blocks
fake verified timestamp claims. Stage360 does not claim real OTS or RFC3161
verification.
Stage361 extends Stage360 by adding a revocation proof injection gate to the QSP evidence rail.
Stage360 binds the Stage359 public key fingerprint result into external timestamp proof metadata.
Stage361 adds the next missing verification layer: whether the related key or certificate is revoked.
Stage360 external timestamp proof result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage359 public key fingerprint is used as the revocation target.
OCSP proof metadata receiver is created.
CRL proof metadata receiver is created.
Signed revocation metadata receiver is created.
Missing real revocation proof returns pending_revocation_proof.
Revoked status, fake OCSP verified claims, fake CRL verified claims, and private material leakage are blocked.
Stage361 does not claim real OCSP or CRL cryptographic verification.
Stage362 extends Stage361 by adding an asynchronous proof promotion gate.
It does not treat pending proof as acceptance.
It decides whether pending timestamp or revocation proof can be promoted after new proof metadata is added.
Stage361 created the revocation proof receiver.
Stage362 reviews whether that pending proof may be promoted, kept pending, rejected, or blocked.
Stage361 revocation proof result is bound as previous_hash.
Missing proof returns keep_pending.
Consistent proof can return promote.
Inconsistent proof returns reject_promotion.
Revoked status, fake verified claims, unknown-as-good, and private material leakage return block.
Stage362 does not claim real OCSP, CRL, OpenTimestamps, RFC3161, Rekor, or Sigstore verification.
Stage363 extends Stage362 by adding an external timestamp proof verification gate for OpenTimestamps and RFC3161.
It focuses on timestamp proof verification and does not verify OCSP or CRL revocation status.
Stage360 created the external timestamp proof binding receiver.
Stage362 created the asynchronous proof promotion gate.
Stage363 checks whether external timestamp proof metadata can support timestamp verification.
Stage362 promotion result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage360 timestamp target hash is used as the verification target.
Missing proof returns timestamp_pending.
Target hash mismatch returns timestamp_rejected.
Verified timestamp proof can return timestamp_verified.
Stage364: Real Timestamp Proof Injection & Promotion Engine
Stage364 extends Stage363 by adding a real timestamp proof injection and promotion engine for OpenTimestamps and RFC3161.
It reviews whether timestamp_pending can be promoted to timestamp_verified.
Stage363 created the external timestamp proof verification gate.
Stage364 injects real timestamp verification evidence and checks whether the target hash matches the Stage360 timestamp target.
Stage363 timestamp verification result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage360 timestamp target hash is used as the promotion target.
Missing real verification evidence returns timestamp_pending.
Target hash mismatch returns timestamp_rejected.
Valid OpenTimestamps or RFC3161 verification evidence with matching target hash can return timestamp_verified.
Stage365: Verified Timestamp Promotion Test Harness
Stage365 extends Stage364 by adding a safe timestamp promotion test harness with a fake-verified claim guard.
It does not convert production evidence to timestamp_verified.
Stage365 tests whether the timestamp promotion path is safe before connecting a real OpenTimestamps or RFC3161 verifier adapter.
Stage364 timestamp promotion result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage366: Real OpenTimestamps / RFC3161 Verifier Adapter
Stage366 extends Stage365 by adding a real OpenTimestamps / RFC3161 verifier adapter.
It does not treat Stage365 simulation as production timestamp verification.
Stage365 safely tested the timestamp promotion path.
Stage366 connects that safe test result to real verifier output readiness.
Stage365 promotion test result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage365 simulation is not treated as production verification.
Stage360 timestamp target hash is used as the verification target.
Missing real verifier output returns verifier_pending.
Target hash mismatch returns verifier_rejected.
Real OpenTimestamps or RFC3161 verifier output with matching target hash can return timestamp_verified.
Fake verified claims, secret leakage, missing Stage365 test, or Stage365 test failure return block.
Stage367: Production Timestamp Verification Activation Gate
Stage367 extends Stage366 by adding a production timestamp verification activation gate for OpenTimestamps / RFC3161.
It can move verifier_pending to timestamp_verified only when real verifier output exists.
Stage366 created the real verifier adapter.
Stage367 activates production verification with matching Stage360 target hash and verified output evidence.
Stage366 verifier adapter result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage360 timestamp target hash is used as the activation target.
Missing real verifier output returns verifier_pending.
Target hash mismatch returns verifier_rejected.
Real OpenTimestamps or RFC3161 verifier output with matching target hash can return timestamp_verified.
Stage368: Production Timestamp Verification Receipt Layer
Stage368 extends Stage367 by adding a production timestamp verification receipt layer for OpenTimestamps / RFC3161.
It records real verification command receipts as metadata.
Stage367 created the activation gate.
Stage368 fixes command receipt metadata such as exit code, output SHA256, and verified target hash.
Stage367 activation result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage360 timestamp target hash is used as the receipt target.
Stage369: Real Timestamp Verifier Runner with Production Receipt Generation
Stage369 extends Stage368 by adding a real timestamp verifier runner for OpenTimestamps / RFC3161.
It runs or prepares verifier commands and converts their outputs into metadata receipts.
Stage368 created the receipt layer.
Stage369 generates production receipt metadata, but it does not final-accept timestamp_verified.
Stage368 receipt result is bound as previous_hash.
Real verifier commands are not executed unless explicitly enabled.
Runner output is converted into SHA256 metadata receipts.
Missing command target returns runner_pending.
Command failure returns runner_rejected.
exit_code=0 and matching verified_target_hash can return receipt_generated.
Fake verified claims, secret leakage, raw timestamp binary exposure, Stage360 missing, or Stage368 block return block.
Stage369 does not final-accept timestamp_verified; acceptance belongs to the next gate.
Stage370 extends Stage369 by adding a runner safety brake test gate.
It verifies that the timestamp runner fails safely before real timestamp verification success is accepted.
Stage369 created the real timestamp verifier runner.
Stage370 confirms that bad commands, incomplete metadata, fake verified claims, and raw timestamp binary references do not pass.
Stage369 runner result is bound as previous_hash.
A deliberately failing safe command must return runner_rejected.
Missing metadata must not become accepted.
Fake timestamp_verified claims must return block.
Raw timestamp binary references must return block.
Stage370 does not final-accept timestamp_verified.
Stage371: Real Timestamp First Successful Receipt Gate
Stage371 extends Stage370 by adding a real timestamp first successful receipt gate for OpenTimestamps / RFC3161.
It can generate the first successful timestamp receipt only after the Stage370 safety brake tests pass.
Stage370 confirmed that bad commands, incomplete metadata, fake verified claims, and raw timestamp binary references do not pass.
Stage371 uses that safety result before allowing any first successful receipt generation.
Stage370 safety brake result is bound as previous_hash.
Stage370 safety_test_pass is required before first receipt generation.
Missing real verifier command returns first_receipt_pending.
Command failure returns first_receipt_rejected.
exit_code=0 and matching verified_target_hash can return first_receipt_generated.
Fake verified claims, secret leakage, raw timestamp binary exposure, Stage360 missing, or Stage370 failure return block.
Stage371 does not final-accept timestamp_verified; final acceptance belongs to the next gate.
Stage372: Timestamp Verification Final Acceptance Gate
Stage372 extends Stage371 by adding the final timestamp verification acceptance gate.
It reviews the Stage371 first receipt and decides whether timestamp verification can be finally accepted.
Stage371 can generate the first successful timestamp receipt.
Stage372 is the first layer that may set timestamp_verified: true, but only when the Stage371 receipt is complete and consistent.
Stage371 first receipt result is bound as previous_hash.
If Stage371 is pending, Stage372 returns final_acceptance_pending.
If Stage371 is rejected or blocked, Stage372 rejects or blocks.
If Stage371 is first_receipt_generated and receipt metadata is complete, Stage372 can return timestamp_verified.
Final acceptance is written as a public metadata manifest.
Raw timestamp binaries, secrets, and fake verified claims are blocked.
Stage373: Final Acceptance Attestation & External Transparency Binding Gate
Stage373 extends Stage372 by binding the Stage372 final-acceptance result
and manifest into one canonical attestation.
Stage373 does not repeat OpenTimestamps or RFC3161 verification.
It validates the Stage372 result and manifest hashes, generates a shared
binding hash, and prepares external Sigstore, Rekor, and optional
standalone ML-DSA verification.
Stage372 to Stage373
Stage372 final acceptance result
+ Stage372 final acceptance manifest
↓
independent SHA256 validation
↓
canonical Stage372 binding
↓
Stage373 final acceptance attestation
↓
Sigstore signature verification
+ Rekor inclusion-proof verification
+ optional standalone ML-DSA verification
Current Initial State
Stage372 decision: final_acceptance_pending
Stage372 timestamp verified: false
Stage373 decision: attestation_pending
External transparency bound: false
PQC signature verified: false
Stage373 never converts the current pending Stage372 result into a
verified final acceptance.
External Transparency Checks
Stage372 result SHA256 validation
Stage372 manifest SHA256 validation
Result and manifest consistency validation
Canonical Stage372 binding SHA256 generation
Sigstore signed-attestation binding
Signer identity and OIDC issuer verification
Rekor log ID and log index confirmation
Rekor Signed Entry Timestamp verification
Rekor inclusion-proof verification
Optional standalone ML-DSA verification
Safety Boundary
No private keys are published.
No raw secrets or OIDC tokens are published.
No raw QKD key material is published.
No raw timestamp binaries are published in public docs.
Unsupported verified claims are blocked.
ML-DSA remains unverified until real verification evidence exists.
Stage374: Production Sigstore Signing & Rekor Inclusion Verification Gate
Stage374 extends Stage373 by performing production Sigstore signing
and Rekor transparency-log inclusion verification for the Stage373
final-acceptance attestation.
Stage373 prepared the attestation and external verification receiver.
Stage374 uses GitHub Actions OIDC, Cosign, and a Sigstore bundle to
produce real external verification evidence.
After complete Sigstore and Rekor verification, while Stage372 remains
pending, the correct decision becomes
pending_state_transparency_bound.
Current Verified State
Decision:
pending_state_transparency_bound
External transparency bound:
true
Stage372 final acceptance:
false
GitHub Actions run:
29295518405
Cosign version:
3.1.1
Signature verified:
true
Workflow identity verified:
true
GitHub Actions OIDC issuer verified:
true
Rekor inclusion verified:
true
This means that the Stage372 pending state was successfully signed
through GitHub Actions OIDC and bound to the external Sigstore/Rekor
transparency infrastructure. It does not mean that Stage372 timestamp
final acceptance has completed.
Stage375: Production ML-DSA-65 Dual-Signature Verification & Downgrade Prevention Gate
Stage375 extends Stage374 by adding real ML-DSA-65 signing and
verification for the same Stage373 attestation blob already verified
through Sigstore, Cosign, GitHub Actions OIDC, and Rekor.
The Stage374 Sigstore/Rekor signature and the Stage375 ML-DSA-65
signature were verified against the same Stage373 attestation blob.
The ML-DSA private key was not published.
Downgrade Prevention
When pqc_required is enabled, a valid Sigstore signature
alone is not sufficient. A missing, invalid, removed, or mismatched
ML-DSA-65 signature fails closed.
Safety Boundary
No ML-DSA private key is published.
No ML-DSA seed is published.
The production workflow uses an encrypted GitHub Actions secret. A local development copy of the private key may exist outside the public repository.
The temporary private key created inside the GitHub Actions runner is deleted before artifact upload.
Stage376: Production Dual-Timestamp Verification
& Superseding Final Acceptance Gate
Stage376 extends Stage375 by applying two independent external
timestamp verification methods—RFC3161 and OpenTimestamps—to the
canonical Stage360 timestamp target.
Stage376 does not rewrite the historic Stage372 record.
Stage372 remains preserved as
final_acceptance_pending.
Stage376 creates a new effective final-acceptance state only after
both timestamp verification methods are independently verified
against the same canonical target.
Stage376 is currently in a safe pending state.
The canonical Stage360 timestamp target and the fixed production
workflow inputs have been prepared, but neither RFC3161 nor
OpenTimestamps production verification has completed.
Stage376 must not claim timestamp verification, external final
acceptance, or maximum timestamp assurance until independently
valid RFC3161 and OpenTimestamps verification receipts are imported
and validated against the same Stage360 target.
RFC3161 Production Verification
Stage376 is designed to generate an RFC3161 timestamp request for
the canonical Stage360 target, submit it to a configured Timestamp
Authority, receive the timestamp response, and verify the response
cryptographically with OpenSSL.
The current public RFC3161 receipt is an initial safety receipt.
Its execution status is not_executed, and the TSA URL,
request hash, response hash, timestamp-token hash, message imprint,
generation time, verification exit code, TSA signature result, and
certificate-chain result have not yet been recorded.
RFC3161 verification may be marked as successful only after a fixed
GitHub Actions workflow produces a complete metadata receipt whose
target hash matches the canonical Stage360 target.
OpenTimestamps Verification
OpenTimestamps is the second independent timestamp method required
by the Stage376 dual-timestamp policy.
Until an OpenTimestamps proof is independently verified against the
same Stage360 target and a confirmed public anchor is recorded,
Stage376 remains in a partial verification state.
Final Acceptance Rule
Stage376 may return
dual_timestamp_final_acceptance_verified
only when every required condition below is satisfied.
Stage376 does not alter or overwrite Stage372.
Instead, it preserves Stage372 as historical evidence and creates a
later superseding operational state after stronger external proof
requirements are satisfied.
Fail-Closed Enforcement
RFC3161 success alone is not dual-timestamp acceptance.
OpenTimestamps success alone is not dual-timestamp acceptance.
A target-hash mismatch blocks final acceptance.
A missing verification receipt keeps the result pending.
An unsupported verified claim is blocked.
A fake verified claim is blocked.
A failed Stage375 prerequisite blocks final acceptance.
Publication Boundary
No private keys are published.
No ML-DSA private key or seed is published.
No OIDC or GitHub token is published.
No raw QKD key material is published.
No raw TSQ file is published.
No raw TSR file is published.
No raw RFC3161 timestamp token is published.
No raw OpenTimestamps binary proof is published by default.
No TSA certificate bundle is published.
No free-form timestamp command is accepted.
Only metadata receipts and public verification results are published.
Stage376 currently proves that the dual-timestamp verification
target, policy, fixed execution mode, safety boundaries, and initial
metadata receivers have been prepared.
The historic Stage372 evidence remains preserved without
modification. Stage376 is designed to create a later superseding
effective state rather than rewriting the original Stage372 record.
It does not yet prove successful RFC3161 verification,
OpenTimestamps verification, dual-timestamp final acceptance, or
maximum timestamp assurance.
Stage376 prepares a cryptographically verifiable superseding
final acceptance state while preserving the complete historical
Stage372 evidence unchanged.
Stage377
Production Dual-Timestamp Finalization and
Superseding Final Acceptance Gate
Stage377 adds production dual-timestamp finalization directly
on top of Stage376.
Stage376 prepared the fixed Stage360 timestamp target,
dual-timestamp verification policy, Fail-Closed requirements,
publication boundary, and initial metadata receipt structures.
Stage377 connects that prepared state to production RFC3161
and OpenTimestamps verification receipts.
Stage377 does not remove, reorganize, replace, or rewrite the
Stage376 page. The complete Stage376 page remains preserved
before this Stage377 section.
Stage377 Purpose
Stage377 establishes a later superseding effective final
acceptance only when RFC3161 and OpenTimestamps independently
verify the same fixed Stage360 target.
Stage376 Prepared Dual-Timestamp State
↓
Production RFC3161 Verification
+
Production OpenTimestamps Verification
↓
Same Stage360 Target Confirmation
↓
Stage377 Dual-Timestamp Finalization Gate
↓
Verified / Pending / Block
Current Fail-Closed State
Decision:timestamp_finalization_pending
RFC3161 Verified: False OpenTimestamps Verified: False Effective Final Acceptance: False Maximum Timestamp Assurance: False
This is the correct initial state. Stage377 must not claim
successful dual-timestamp final acceptance until both
independent external verification receipts satisfy every
required condition.
Stage377 Adds
Production RFC3161 timestamp acquisition and verification
RFC3161 message-imprint verification
TSA signature verification
TSA certificate-chain verification
Production OpenTimestamps proof generation
OpenTimestamps public-anchor verification
Verified timestamp-time confirmation
Same Stage360 target SHA256 enforcement
Two-independent-proof requirement
Superseding effective final-acceptance decision
Metadata-only public verification receipts
Fail-Closed pending and block decisions
Production RFC3161 Verification
The RFC3161 workflow creates a timestamp request for the fixed
canonical Stage360 target.
The returned timestamp response is checked with OpenSSL.
Stage377 requires verification of the target message imprint,
TSA signature, certificate chain, generation time, and fixed
target SHA256.
Raw TSQ, TSR, RFC3161 token, and certificate-bundle files
remain outside the public docs directory.
Only a metadata verification receipt may be published.
Production OpenTimestamps Verification
The OpenTimestamps workflow creates a proof for the same fixed
Stage360 target.
A newly created OpenTimestamps proof may remain pending while
waiting for confirmation by a public blockchain anchor.
Stage377 preserves that waiting state and does not convert it
into a false success.
The proof is not accepted as verified until its target hash,
public anchor, anchor reference, and verified time satisfy the
Stage377 policy.
Stage377 Acceptance Conditions
Requirement
Mandatory condition
Stage376 prerequisite
Required Stage376 result and fixed hash are valid
Historic Stage372 evidence
Fixed Stage372 evidence hash remains unchanged
RFC3161 target
Message imprint matches the fixed Stage360 target
RFC3161 signature
TSA signature verification succeeds
RFC3161 certificate
TSA certificate-chain verification succeeds
OpenTimestamps target
Proof target matches the fixed Stage360 target
OpenTimestamps anchor
Public anchor and verified time are confirmed
Common target
Both receipts bind to the same Stage360 SHA256
Verified proof count
Two independent timestamp proofs are verified
Publication boundary
No raw proof or private material exists under docs
Stage377 Decisions
Decision
Meaning
timestamp_finalization_pending
Neither external timestamp system has completed all
final verification requirements.
rfc3161_verified_opentimestamps_pending
RFC3161 is verified, but OpenTimestamps remains pending.
opentimestamps_verified_rfc3161_pending
OpenTimestamps is verified, but RFC3161 remains pending.
dual_timestamp_final_acceptance_verified
Both independent proofs verified the same Stage360
target and the superseding effective final-acceptance
state was established.
block
A prerequisite, required hash, proof, claim,
consistency rule, or publication boundary failed.
Fail-Closed Enforcement
RFC3161 success alone is not dual-timestamp final acceptance.
OpenTimestamps success alone is not dual-timestamp final
acceptance.
A missing verification receipt keeps the state pending.
A target-hash mismatch blocks final acceptance.
A previous-hash mismatch blocks final acceptance.
An internally inconsistent receipt is blocked.
An unsupported verified claim is blocked.
A fabricated verified claim is blocked.
A publication-boundary violation is blocked.
A failed Stage376 prerequisite blocks final acceptance.
Fixed Hash Bindings
Stage376 result SHA256 32ff58a1f4d5837518226eee70b32833a8147617df3142ff2f641eca3f116138
Only metadata receipts and public verification results are
published.
Historic Preservation
Stage377 does not alter or overwrite Stage372 or Stage376.
It preserves both earlier stages as historical evidence.
Stage377 creates a later superseding operational state only
after the stronger dual-timestamp requirements are satisfied.
It does not rewrite an earlier final-acceptance record.
Current Meaning
Stage377 currently proves that the production dual-timestamp
workflows, fixed hash bindings, Fail-Closed finalization
engine, metadata receipt structures, and publication boundary
have been prepared.
The current initial result remains
timestamp_finalization_pending.
Stage377 therefore does not yet claim successful RFC3161
verification, successful OpenTimestamps verification,
dual-timestamp final acceptance, or maximum timestamp
assurance.
After both independent systems verify the same fixed Stage360
target, Stage377 can establish the later superseding effective
final-acceptance state.
Stage378 extends Stage377 by binding public QKD safety metadata to the validated Stage377 result hash.
It classifies evidence as metadata only, QKD simulator, controlled testbed, or physical QKD system, while verifying that no raw or derived QKD secret material is published.
Stage378 does not hard-code one universal QBER threshold. It validates observed_qber, declared_qber_limit, qber_within_declared_limit, and limit_source.